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Abstract:
The recent election results in US, Germany, Japan and China and vote for BRIXIT in 
Britian suggest that political outcomes increasingly relate to the economic, political and 
social orientation in both developed and developing countries. Countries that have not 
promoted social and economic harmony in the country - democracy eventually puts the 
pressure through the discontent local polity resulting in election outcomes similar to US 
presidential elections in 2016. To avoid anti-globalization feelings among local 
population and its negative outcomes, improving political orientation towards greater 
participation of local polity and investments in education in developing countries would 
result in more equality. The research is applicable to countries like India, China, Pakistan, 
Argentina, Sub-Saharan Africa who have all liberalised but still need to draw lessons 
from East Asia for their Industrialisation and Growth Promotion with early emphasis on 
Social and Institutional Development.
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Introduction: 
Unequal distribution of the benefits of accelerated globalisation, since 1980, has 
disadvantaged sub-Saharan and even, Latin American countries in terms of either 
negative or indifferent growth rates (Murshed 2003). This has occurred, despite the fact 
that most of these nations became more open in the sense of rising shares of 
international trade in national income. Associated with this phenomenon of increasing 
openness is, rising within-nation income inequality post-1980. Increased trade, 
particularly of the inter-industry variety, alters the composition of output in the economy 
away from non-traded goods towards traded products. This will affect the functional 
distribution of income, usually raising the demand for the factor of production employed 
intensively in the traded sector. In the developed world, it is skilled labour and we have 
witnessed an increase in the skilled-unskilled labour relative wage premium. In many 
OECD countries, this has meant a more unequal personal distribution of income. As far 
as developing countries are concerned, especially in those that export unskilled labour 
intensive manufactured goods, we would expect a fall in the skilled-unskilled labour 
relative wage premium leading to reduced inequality, since the unskilled are more 
numerous within the population. Yet this is generally not true, and inequality in the 
developing world has risen, mirroring events in the OECD. What accounts for this 
paradox? Perhaps developing countries have such quantities of unskilled labour that 
unskilled wages will not respond to increased demand. This certainly appears likely in 
1cross-country studies where China and India are included. Alternatively, other less 
populous developing countries may be exporting relatively more skilled labour intensive 
products such as semi-conductors or capital-intensive commodities as is the case with 
fuels and minerals. Finally, an expansion in international trade may raise the demand for, 
and reward of, skilled labour even when the country in question is exporting unskilled 
labour intensive products due to skill shortages and other factor complementarities.
Many studies have tried to capture the relationship between trade liberalisation and 
income inequality. A paper by Dollar and Kraay (2004) concludes that liberalisation does 
not significantly affect the distribution of income, and at most, the relationship is of 
neutral nature. However, their results have been widely challenged because of their 
methodology and variable choice. (Ravallion 2003; Amann et al. 2002) Ravallion (2003) 
points out that increased openness can lead to a rise in the demand for relatively skilled 
labour, which tends towards less equal distribution in poor relative to rich countries. 
Arbache, Dickerson and Green (2004) find that imported technology raised the relative 
demand for highly skilled labour in Brazil and thus lowered the relative wages of less 
educated groups. Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely (2001) observe that inequality has 
increased in seven out of 18 Latin American countries that initiated market reforms in 
the mid-1980s. Jayasuriya (2002) accepts that trade liberalisation may have reduced 
consumption poverty in South Asia, but is sceptical about the purportedly neutral 
distributional effects of liberalisation. Many suggest that the distribution of the positive 
effects of liberalisation is somewhat skewed towards urban households rather than rural 
ones, and to wealthy rather than poor households (see Chen and Ravallion 2003; 
Cockburn 2002; Friedman 2000; Lofgren 1999). The evidence in this regard comes 
mainly from Latin America because most of the economies there undertook rigorous 
reform policies in the mid-1980s following the debt crisis in that decade. Legovini, 
Bouillon and Lustig (2001) find that inequality in Mexico rose sharply between 1984 and 
1994, and rising returns to skilled labour accounted for 20 per cent of the increase in the 
inequality in household income. Similarly, Hanson and Harrison (1999) find that the 
reduction in tariffs and the elimination of import licenses accounts for 23 per cent of the 
increase in the relative wages of skilled labour during 1986-90, thus providing evidence 
for the role liberalisation played in rising inequality in Mexico. Other country studies on 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, also show that skilled workers received increased 
premiums after liberalisation when compared to their unskilled counterparts. (World 
Bank 2001) Therefore, the balance of the evidence points to increased globalisation 
inducing greater income inequality. 
Irrespective of the exact nature of the cause of trade-induced inequality, it is sensible 
to presume that nations with higher stocks of human capital will experience less of the 
un-equalising spiral consequent upon globalisation and trade liberalisation. Investment in 
education may yield a double dividend. It cannot only promote growth, but also 
suppresses inequality by both bequeathing skills as well as moderating rises in skill-
premia following an expansion of international trade. More generally, Tinbergen (1975) 
pointed out that changes in wage inequality are a result of the opposing forces that 
technological change (skilled labour demand) and education (skilled labour supply/ 
human capital) exert on relative wages. Eiche and Garcia-Penalosa (2001: 19) suggest that 
human capital accumulation plays a dual role in development. Because the stock of 
educated workers in an economy determines both the degree of income inequality and its 
rate of growth, making the parameters of the demand for and supply of labour crucial 
determinants of inequality increases or decreases as an economy accumulates human 
capital. 
2The aim of this study is to examine the impact of increased trade on inequality, and 
investigate whether a higher human capital stock moderates this unequalising aspect of 
international trade; specifically the skilled-unskilled wage differential. High initial 
endowments of human capital, captured by data on average years of schooling for 
example, imply a more egalitarian society compared to countries with a lower human 
capital endowment. When societies that are more equal, open up their economies further, 
increased trade is likely to induce less inequality because the supply of skills better 
matches demand. Yet greater international exposure also brings about technological 
diffusion, see Winters (2004), further raising skilled labour demand. This may raise wage 
inequality, in contrast to the initial egalitarian level effect of human capital. This 
proposed study will attempt to measure these two opposing forces. Another purpose of 
this analysis is to examine what type of education most reduces inequality. In settings of 
low human capital endowments, as measured by literacy or low primary school 
enrolment, a policy of relative neglect of primary in favour of expenditure on tertiary 
education may have a less than benign influence on inequality. 
We also include institutions in our analysis. Discussion on institutions is generally 
absent in this debate. The proposal contends that here may also be a strong connection 
between good institutions and smooth labour markets. Thus such questions are also 
important: Are more educated societies with better legal, political and economic 
institutions more capable to absorb the upward pressure relative ages of the skilled 
against unskilled? Does the presence of good institutions form grounds for technical 
change with overall fewer distortions in labor market returns? If yes then good 
institutions would be expected to put a down ward pressure on wage inequality.  
2. A Note on Theil Wage Inequality: 
The analysis employs the UTIP-UNIDO wage inequality Theil measure calculated by 
University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) based on UNIDO 2001. This data set is a 
set of measures of the dispersion of pay across industrial categories in the manufacturing 
sector, drawn from the Industrial database published annually by United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). The Theil index is decomposable. 
(Conceicao and Galbraith 2001) If individuals are grouped in a mutually exclusive, 
completely exhaustive way, overall inequality can be separated into a between group 
component and a within group component. Thus, there is no interaction between these 
two components and so these measures are additively decomposable. Moreover of all 
entropy-based measures, the Theil index is one of only two measures for which the 
weights in the within groups component add to one. Therefore, overall inequality is the 
result of adding the two independent components: inequality between groups and 
inequality within groups. 
This chapter employs the Theil index or more specifically a measure of inequality in 
manufacturing pay between skilled and unskilled labour, instead of taking measures of 
absolute inequality, which would capture the personal income distribution (GINI). 
Several considerations motivate this decision. First, comparable and consistent measures 
of income inequality, whether on a household level or per head basis are difficult, almost 
implausible and generally fail to provide adequate or accurate longitudinal and cross-
country coverage. By contrast, inequality of manufacturing pay, based on UNIDO 
Industrial Statistics provides indicators of inequality that are more stable, more reliable 
and more comparable across countries because UNIDO measures are based on a two or 
three digit code of International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), a single 
3systematic accounting framework. Furthermore, measuring manufacturing pay 
accurately is routine in most countries around the world. (Galbraith and Kum 2002) 
Second, pay is major source of household income. Changes in income inequality 
reflect changes in wage inequality. Fields (1980) offers evidence that pay inequalities in 
the manufacturing sector are the driving force behind the evolution of inequality. 
Furthermore as discussed above, processes of globalisation through technological change 
raises the concentration of skilled workers in advanced sectors against unskilled workers 
in the backward sector. Since manufacturing is the sector most affected by modern 
technological change, income inequality would certainly have an inter-industrial feature 
that would show up in changing pay differentials between advanced and backward 
manufacturing industries. (Galbraith and Kum 2002) 
Third, the principal reason for using the UTIP-UNIDO wage inequality Theil 
measure is that the researcher is more interested in the functional distribution of income. 
Changes in the functional distribution between skilled and unskilled labour, will in turn 
affect the personal income distribution in countries that are unskilled labour abundant. 
Inequality will rise as the skilled-unskilled labour wage premium increases and vice versa.
The UTIP- UNIDO wage inequality measure is the between-group component of 
Theil’s T statistic, an entropy measure whose functional form is defined as: 
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measure, where groups are defined as categories within the UNIDO industrial 
classification codes. 
Theil is not a measure with a closed scale between 0 and 1 (or 0% and 100%), like in 
case of the GINI index. For resource distributions described by only two quantiles, the 
Theil index is 0 for 50:50 distributions, 0.5 for 74: 26 distributions, 1 for 82:18 
distributions, 2 for 92:8 distributions and 4 at 98:2 distributions. Theil at 1 is close to an 
80:20 distribution, which is very close to a distribution often referred to as “Pareto 
Principle”.1 The UNIDO-UTIP Theil Index provides inequality between groups only 
(One being skilled and other being unskilled). Though the data is not available for within 
group inequality, we cannot discount it because there may also be rise in inequality within 
skilled labor. For example if skills are captured by education level, rising within group 
inequality would mean that returns to higher levels of education and returns to lower 
levels of education do not change at the same proportion. 
Here, we want to capture the effect of education (skilled) versus no education 
(unskilled) on relative wages. We would also analyze effect of higher skills within the 
framework to check if wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor are rising also 
because of returns to higher education are rising at higher proportion when compared 
1 This is a special case of the wider phenomenon of Pareto distributions. If the parameters in the Pareto 
distribution are suitably chosen, then one would have not only 80% of effects coming from 20% of causes, 
but also 80% of that top 80% of effects coming from 20% of that top 20% of causes, and so on (80% of 
80% is 64%; 20% of 20% is 4%, so this implies a "64-4 law") http://
management.about.com/cs/generalmanagement/a/Pareto081202.htm
4with overall levels of education. In other words, is wage inequality also pushed by 
favoring higher skills in developing countries, or presence of skills (having education) a 
factor decisive enough to explain rise in wage gaps between skilled labor and unskilled 
labor? There is already some evidence that secondary education is more important in 
alleviating wage inequality than higher levels of education suggesting close correlation 
between higher levels of education and wage dispersion (Acemoglu, 2001). Investing in 
higher education alone is less effective in alleviating wage inequality. Since Theil captures 
wage inequality and not wage equality, we can easily test the positive effect of higher 
education in wage inequality. We are not saying that decreasing higher levels of education 
would then decrease wage inequality as is generally true with interpretations upon getting 
a positive sign (say between Theil Index and higher levels of education). If there is a 
positive correlation, then the only way to minimize the education bias of inequality is to 
raise the overall education levels of the population, which in turn would distribute skills 
homogenously within the population. 
The between group inequality, , ranges from 0 to less than 1 (0.36 for the current BT
UNIDO data set). On the hind sight, this suggests that adding within group inequality 
would further add up to increase the value of closer to 1 meaning that over all wage wT T
inequality between skilled and unskilled is steeper than what is captured by only. As BT
suggested; by checking the relationship between higher levels of education and ‘between 
group wage inequality’ , we would be able to see whether between group inequality is BT
also present. It is possible if higher levels of education are more sensitive to wage 
inequality than average levels of education which include primary, secondary and higher. 
The UTIP data set provides Theil inequality measures for nearly 3,200 country/year 
observations, covering more than 150 countries during the period 1963 to 1999. Figure 1 
illustrates trends in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, over time in 
selected developing countries and is representative of different regions. All the country 
graphs, except one, show that wage inequality has been on the rise in the 1980s and 
1990s. The only exception is Singapore, which belongs to a group associated with the 
‘East Asian Miracle’ of the 1980s. However, this miracle remained confined to a few 
countries and as it is evident from the graphs, Singapore is not representative of the 
developing world. Since the 1980s and 1990s are associated with Structural Adjustment 
Policies under which many developing countries embraced trade liberalization, it is safe to 
suggest that the above trends in wage inequality also relate to these market reforms. The 
end of the chapter lists all developing countries, and the latest year for which the Theil 
wage inequality index is available. 
Singapore is one such country which invested heavily on social development and 
raised the average education levels of its population. Is this the reasons why wage 
inequality is falling in Singapore post liberalization? In social development, Singapore 
indeed represents the good side of the story. The other side of the story is more 
applicable to developing countries where larger segments of the population are un-
educated. Over all trend in developing countries post liberalization should be a rise in 
wage dispersion when skill bias technical change raise skill premia by favoring the 
educated over uneducated. 
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Graph 1 Trends in Wage Inequality in Developing Countries:
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63. Primary Analysis: 
The initial analysis devised a basic model for wage inequality between skilled and 
unskilled workers which was dependent on integration as well as initial skills and have 2 
equations (see Mamoon and Murshed, 2008)
Wage …………… (2)],[ 0SkillsnIntegratiofInequality 
                                       (+)             (-)
Here integration represents trade liberalization and Skills represent pre liberalization 
education levels. In confirmation to their model specifications, Mamoon and Murshed 
(2008) find that 
(1)  Trade liberalization is associated with higher wage inequality and 
(2) Developing countries with a higher level of initial human capital do well against rising 
wage inequality. 
This initial research provides empirical evidence that establishes the negative role of trade 
liberalization in welfare generation. One of the primary cause of rise in wage inequality in 
developing countries is also highlighted which is inadequate supply of human capital 
before the liberalization process was initiated. 
However the study had many limitations. First it is undertaken on a cross section data 
which allocates single observation to each country. Secondly the Wage inequality 
equation is very simple in nature depending on only two explanatory variables. Third, it 
does not examine how education is related with wage inequality post liberalization. The 
proposed study intends to extend on the methodology and empirical model. 
4. Data and Methodology: 
The first step in this study is to extend the dataset from cross section to panel. Our 
empirical model based on panel data would have the following form
………………..(3)],,[ 1SkillsrientationPoliticalOnIntegratioflityWageInequa 
                                       +                    -                           -
Here Integration represents trade liberalization, which has a positive impact on wage 
inequality. Institutions represent political orientation and have a negative/positive impact 
on wage inequality.  captures education levels achieved. 1Skills
7              
Table 1: Data and Sources                                   
Variable Description/ Source                                                                   
Period
Wage 
Inequality
Theil Index/ University of Texas Inequality Project                                                             
1963-1999
Integration Openness/World Development Indicators                                                             
1960-2009
Trade Policy/ World Trade Map                                                             
1980-2008
Institutions Democracy, Autocracy/Polity IV project                                                             
1960-2009
Corruption/Transparency International                                                             
1975-2009
Economic and Political Risk/ International Country Risk Guide                                                             
1984-2009
Skills Average years of schooling/ Baro and Lee Data set                                     
1960-1999
Average years of primary schooling/ Baro and Lee Data set                                                             
1960-1999
Average years of secondary schooling/ Baro and Lee Data set                                                             
1960-1999
Average years of higher schooling/ Baro and Lee Data set                                                             
1960-1999
Average years of schooling for males/ Baro and Lee Data set                                                             
1960-1999
Average years of schooling for females/ Baro and Lee Data set                                                             
1960-1999
5. Results:
Table 2 presents results for democracy. It can be observed that countries that are 
politically stable and that have empowered the local polity through transparent and 
inclusive electoral process witness less wage inequality upon trade liberalization. This has 
generally been the case in most developed countries of the North especially the EU. 
Improved educational attainments all across the sample of developed and developing 
countries also contain inequality in wages. The role of politics-as opposed to strict 
market forces – in the 20th century reduction and subsequent widening of inequality is 
also confirmed by a World Bank Report (1993) on eight countries (Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Honk Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia) which used to be 
known as the tiger economies. It describes how, with well publicized programs of shared 
growth they all deliberately reduced their income differentials during the period 1960-
1980. Policies variously included land reform, subsidies to lower fertilizer prices to boost 
rural incomes, wealth sharing programs, and large scale public housing programs, and 
assistance to worker cooperatives. The report says that in each case governments reduced 
inequalities primarily because they faced challenges to their legitimacy, often from 
communist rivals, and needed to win wider public support. Thus it is in their self interest 
to strengthen the precedence of democratic values at local governance structures that 
took development initiatives at grass roots level. For example South Korea faced North 
8Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong faced the claims of China, and the communist guerilla 
forces operated widely. So here, as in the rich developed countries, it is a mistake to think 
that main changes in inequality have resulted simply from impersonal market forces 
rather than from political and ideological processes. 
Table 3 suggests that less than benign democratic setup including outright 
dictatorships have been detrimental to skilled and unskilled wage equality. Partly the 
results depict the situation in high growth economies in the developing peripheries that 
have actively embraced and promoted free market economic policies by opening up 
industry and services to international competition and thus creating an enabling 
environment for economic growth but could not keep pace in political empowerment of 
the population. Furthermore most developing countries have promoted tertiary 
education in contrast to school education and thereby provided an indirect subsidy to the 
rich and skilled that benefit from international competition. (Mamoon and Murshed, 
2013)
6. Conclusions:
Political orientation of a country matters in determining the inequality trends in both 
developed and developing countries. International trade is observed to have caused wage 
inequality and that in return has affected the political process within countries resulting in 
change in the policies that have created inequality in the first place. For example, Donald 
Trump victory amid his anti globalization campaignin 2016 indicates that the anti-
globalization sentiment was shared by majority in US that is eventually resulting in the 
possible reverse of US initiatives that promoted international competition in theory and 
practice. Same is true for British vote in favor of BRIXIT in 2016. In contrast to these 
examples, the re-election of Angela Merkal in Germany and Abe in Japan in 2017 
suggests that people eventually seek economic equality within the national borders and 
fair globalization. Chinese president Xi has clamped down corruption in the country that 
was seen as a serious measure towards making the elite accountable and thus he was also 
re-elected. So there is a clear friction between national politics and un equal outcomes of 
globalization. In order to achieve higher growth rates, embracing globalization is 
important but it should be coupled with greater political and social empowerment of the 
population. 
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 Table 2: Second Stage Regression Results for Democracy
Dependent Variable: Theil Index
Independent
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Openness 0.18*** 0.98*** 0.31*** 0.11*** 0.66*** 0.40***
    Trade Policy -1.59*** -1.11*** -1.52*** -1.88*** -1.27*** -1.09***
Democracy -1.04*** -1.02*** -1.24*** -1.99*** -2.56*** -0.88*** -1.19*** -1.67*** -1.03*** -1.44*** -1.16*** -1.52***
Average Years of Schooling -0.26*** -0.70***
Average Years of Primary Schooling -0.02*** -0.87***
Average Years of Secondary Schooling -0.45*** -0.78***
Average Years of Higher Schooling 0.71 -0.65***
Average Years of Schooling for Males 0.31 -0.99***
Average Years of Schooling for Females -0.67** -0.02**
N 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444
F 42.89*** 42.02*** 61.97*** 56.43*** 72.90*** 82.63*** 71.57*** 67.99*** 62.89*** 68.71*** 52.09*** 42.16***
R 0.67 0.71 0.82 0.78 0.66 0.59 0.73 0.55 0.46 0.52 0.61 0.74
-  *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993).
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Table 3: Second Stage Regression Results for Autocracy 
Dependent Variable: Theil Index
Independent
Variables
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Openness 0.11*** 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.19*** 016*** 0.34***
    Trade Policy -12.38*** -12.41*** -11.92*** -9.56*** -18.67*** -11.09***
Autocracy 0.54*** 0.02*** 0.24*** -0.95*** 0.32*** 0.48*** 0.19*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.14*** 0.22*** 0.17***
Average Years of Schooling -1.11** -1.94***
Average Years of Primary Schooling -1.67*** -2.23***
Average Years of Secondary Schooling -1.35*** -1.80***
Average Years of Higher Schooling -1.12*** -1.43***
Average Years of Schooling for Males -1.06*** -1.79***
Average Years of Schooling for Females -1.67** -1.02**
N 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444
F 55.09*** 60.85** 66.97*** 71.43*** 65.30*** 88.43*** 73.67*** 71.92*** 55.81*** 78.71*** 62.49*** 52.47***
R 0.86 0.81 0.83 0.78 0.76 0.69 0.78 0.85 0.66 0.72 0.81 0.65
-  *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993).
